2025-09-20 AI创业新闻

UNC1549 Hacks 34 Devices in 11 Telecom Firms via LinkedIn Job Lures and MINIBIKE Malware

An Iran-nexus cyber espionage group known as UNC1549 has been attributed to a new campaign targeting European telecommunications companies, successfully infiltrating 34 devices across 11 organizations as part of a recruitment-themed activity on LinkedIn. Swiss cybersecurity company PRODAFT is tracking the cluster under the name Subtle Snail . It’s assessed to be affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The targeted 11 companies are located in Canada, France, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

“The group operates by posing as HR representatives from legitimate entities to engage employees, then compromises them through deployment of a MINIBIKE backdoor variant that communicates with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure proxied through Azure cloud services to bypass detection,” the company said in a report shared with The Hacker News. UNC1549 (aka TA455), believed to be active since at least June 2022, shares overlaps with two other Iranian hacking groups known as Smoke Sandstorm and Crimson Sandstorm (aka Imperial Kitten, TA456, Tortoiseshell, and Yellow Liderc). The threat actor was first documented by Google-owned Mandiant in February 2024. The use of job-themed lures by UNC1549 was subsequently detailed by Israeli cybersecurity company ClearSky, which detailed the adversary’s targeting of the aerospace industry as far back as September 2023 to deliver malware families such as SnailResin and SlugResin.

“The group’s primary motivation involves infiltrating telecommunications entities while maintaining interest in aerospace and defense organizations to establish long-term persistence and exfiltrate sensitive data for strategic espionage purposes,” PRODAFT said. Attacks chains involve extensive reconnaissance on platforms like LinkedIn to identify key personnel within target organizations, specifically focusing on researchers, developers, and IT administrators with elevated access to critical systems and developer environments. In the next phase, the threat actors have been observed sending spear-phishing emails to validate the email addresses and collect additional information before enacting the crucial part of the operation – the fake recruitment drive. To accomplish this, the attackers set up convincing HR account profiles on LinkedIn and reached out to prospective targets with non-existent job opportunities, gradually building trust and credibility to increase the likelihood of success of the scheme.

The campaign is characterized by the meticulous efforts of Subtle Snail operators to tailor the attack for each victim. Should the victim express interest in the offer, they are subsequently contacted via email to schedule a time for an interview by clicking on a fraudulent domain that mimics companies like Telespazio or Safran Group. Entering the necessary information automatically triggers the download of a ZIP archive. Present within the ZIP file is an executable that, once launched, uses DLL side-loading to launch a malicious DLL named MINIBIKE, which then gathers system information and awaits additional payloads in the form of Microsoft Visual C/C++ DLLs to conduct reconnaissance, log keystrokes and clipboard content, steal Microsoft Outlook credentials, collect web browser data from Google Chrome, Brave, and Microsoft Edge, and take screenshots.

The web browser stealer, in particular, incorporates a publicly available tool called Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption to bypass app-bound encryption protections rolled out by Google in order to decrypt and steal passwords stored in the browser. “The Subtle Snail team builds and deploys a victim-specific and unique DLL to the machine each time, even for collecting network configuration information from devices,” PRODAFT noted. “The malicious DLL files used by the threat actor exhibit similar characteristics in the export section.” “Legitimate DLL files are modified to facilitate a seamless execution of a DLL side-loading attack, where function names are substituted with direct string variables. This tactic allows the attacker to bypass typical detection mechanisms by manipulating the DLL’s export table, making it appear as a legitimate file while carrying out malicious activities.” MINIBIKE is a fully-featured, modular backdoor with support for 12 distinct commands to facilitate C2 communication, allowing it to enumerate files and directories, list running processes and terminate specific ones, upload files in chunks, as well as run exe, DLL, BAT, or CMD payloads.

Besides blending its C2 traffic with regular cloud communications by using legitimate Azure cloud services and Virtual Private Servers (VPSes) as proxy infrastructure, the malware makes Windows Registry modifications such that it’s automatically loaded after system startup. It also features anti-debugging and anti-sandbox techniques to hinder analysis, and uses methods like Control Flow Flattening and custom hashing algorithms to resolve Windows API functions at runtime in an effort to resist reverse engineering and make it difficult to understand its overall functionality. “Subtle Snail’s operations cause serious damage by combining intelligence gathering with long-term access to critical telecommunications networks,” PRODAFT said. “They do not just infect devices; they actively search for sensitive data and ways to keep their access alive.” “They use predefined paths to guide their searches and focus on stealing emails, VPN configurations, and other information that helps them maintain control.

They also hunt for confidential files stored in shared folders, which can expose business secrets and personal data.” MuddyWater’s Diversified Toolkit Exposed The disclosure comes as Group-IB sheds light on the infrastructure and malware toolset of another Iranian state-sponsored hacking group known as MuddyWater , which has “significantly” reduced its reliance on Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools in favor of bespoke backdoors and tools like - BugSleep (First seen in May 2024), a Python-based backdoor designed to execute commands and facilitate file transfers LiteInject (First seen in February 2025), a portable executable injector StealthCache (First seen in March 2025), a feature-rich backdoor with capabilities to read/write files, terminate or restart itself, scan for security processes, and steal credential and files Fooder (First seen in March 2025), a loader capable of loading, decrypting, and running an encrypted payload in memory Phoenix (First seen in April 2025), a malware that’s used to deploy a stripped-down variant of BugSleep CannonRat , a malicious tool designed for remote control of compromised systems UDPGangster , a basic backdoor that communicates with its C2 server over the UDP protocol MuddyWater, active since 2017, is assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Also tracked as Boggy Serpens, Mango Sandstorm, and TA450, the threat actor has a history of targeting telecom, government, energy, defense, and critical infrastructure entities in the Middle East, with a newfound spike in attacks targeting Europe and the United States. “Recent activity shows that they still rely on phishing for delivery, leveraging maldocs with malicious macros for infection. Infrastructure analysis has revealed active use of Amazon Web Services (AWS) for hosting malicious assets, and Cloudflare services have been leveraged to hide infrastructure fingerprints and impede analysis,” Group-IB researcher Mansour Alhmoud said.

“MuddyWater’s persistent campaigns underscore its role in supporting Iranian intelligence requirements while maintaining plausible deniability for state-directed cyber operations against both regional competitors and Western targets.” Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

SystemBC Powers REM Proxy With 1,500 Daily VPS Victims Across 80 C2 Servers

A proxy network known as REM Proxy is powered by malware known as SystemBC , offering about 80% of the botnet to its users, according to new findings from the Black Lotus Labs team at Lumen Technologies. “REM Proxy is a sizeable network, which also markets a pool of 20,000 Mikrotik routers and a variety of open proxies it finds freely available online,” the company said in a report shared with The Hacker News. “This service has been a favorite for several actors such as those behind TransferLoader , which has ties to the Morpheus ransomware group.” SystemBC is a C-based malware that turns infected computers into SOCKS5 proxies, allowing infected hosts to communicate with a command-and-control (C2) server and download additional payloads. First documented by Proofpoint in 2019, it’s capable of targeting both Windows and Linux systems .

In a report earlier this January, ANY.RUN revealed that the Linux variant of SystemBC proxy implant is potentially designed for internal corporate services, and that it’s mainly used to target corporate networks, cloud servers, and IoT devices. As is typically the case with any proxy solution, users of the network reach out to SystemBC C2s on high-numbered ports, which then route the user through to one of the victims before reaching their destination. According to Lumen, the SystemBC botnet comprises over 80 C2 servers and a daily average of 1,500 victims, of which nearly 80% are compromised virtual private server (VPS) systems from several large commercial providers. Interestingly, 300 of those victims are part of another botnet called GoBruteforcer (aka GoBrut).

Of these, close to 40% of the compromises have “extremely long average” infection lifespans, lasting over 31 days. To make matters worse, the vast majority of the victimized servers have been found to be susceptible to several known security flaws. Each victim has 20 unpatched CVEs and at least one critical CVE on average, with one of the identified VPS servers in the U.S. city of Atlanta vulnerable to more than 160 unpatched CVEs.

“The victims are made into proxies that enable high volumes of malicious traffic for use by a host of criminal threat groups,” the company noted. “By manipulating VPS systems instead of devices in residential IP space, as is typical in malware-based proxy networks, SystemBC can offer proxies with massive amounts of volume for longer periods of time.” Besides REM Proxy, some of the other customers of the SystemBC include at least two different Russia-based proxy services, one Vietnamese proxy service called VN5Socks (aka Shopsocks5), and a Russian web scraping service. Crucial to the functioning of the malware is the IP address 104.250.164[.]214, which not only hosts the artifacts but also appears to be the source of attacks to recruit potential victims. Once new victims are ensnared, a shell script is dropped on the machine to subsequently deliver the malware.

The botnet operates with little regard for stealth, with the primary goal being to expand in volume to enlist as many devices as possible into the botnet. One of the largest use cases of the illicit network is by the threat actors behind SystemBC themselves, who use it to brute-force WordPress site credentials. The end goal is likely to sell the harvested credentials to other criminal actors in underground forums, who then weaponize them to inject malicious code into the sites in question for follow-on campaigns. “SystemBC has exhibited sustained activity and operational resilience across multiple years, establishing itself as a persistent vector within the cyber threat landscape,” Lumen said.

“Originally used by threat actors to enable ransomware campaigns, the platform has evolved to offer the assembly and sale of bespoke botnets.” “Their model offers considerable advantages: it enables the execution of widespread reconnaissance, spam dissemination, and related activities, allowing an attacker to reserve more selective proxy resources for targeted attacks informed by prior intelligence gathering.” Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Fortra Releases Critical Patch for CVSS 10.0 GoAnywhere MFT Vulnerability

Fortra has disclosed details of a critical security flaw in GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer (MFT) software that could result in the execution of arbitrary commands. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-10035 , carries a CVSS score of 10.0, indicating maximum severity. “A deserialization vulnerability in the License Servlet of Fortra’s GoAnywhere MFT allows an actor with a validly forged license response signature to deserialize an arbitrary actor-controlled object, possibly leading to command injection,” Fortra said in an advisory released Thursday. The company also noted that successful exploitation of the vulnerability is dependent on the system being publicly accessible over the internet.

Users are advised to update to the patched release – version 7.8.4, or the Sustain Release 7.6.3 – to safeguard against potential threats. If immediate patching is not possible, it’s advisable to ensure that access to the GoAnywhere Admin Console is not open to the public. Fortra makes no mention of the flaw being exploited in the wild. That said, previously disclosed shortcomings in the same product ( CVE-2023-0669 , CVSS score: 7.2) were abused as a zero-day by ransomware actors to steal sensitive data.

Then, early last year, it addressed another critical vulnerability in the GoAnywhere MFT ( CVE-2024-0204 , CVSS score: 9.8) that could have been exploited to create new administrator users. “The newly disclosed vulnerability in Fortra’s GoAnywhere MFT solution impacts the same license code path in the Admin Console as the earlier CVE-2023-0669, which was widely exploited by multiple ransomware and APT groups in 2023, including LockBit,” Ryan Dewhurst, head of proactive threat intelligence at watchTowr, said in a statement shared with The Hacker News. “With thousands of GoAnywhere MFT instances exposed to the Internet, this issue is almost certain to be weaponized for in-the-wild exploitation soon. While Fortra notes exploitation requires external exposure, these systems are generally Internet-facing by design, so organizations should assume they are vulnerable.

Organizations should apply the official patches immediately and take steps to restrict external access to the Admin Console.” Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

17,500 Phishing Domains Target 316 Brands Across 74 Countries in Global PhaaS Surge

The phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) offering known as Lighthouse and Lucid has been linked to more than 17,500 phishing domains targeting 316 brands from 74 countries. “Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) deployments have risen significantly recently,” Netcraft said in a new report. “The PhaaS operators charge a monthly fee for phishing software with pre-installed templates impersonating, in some cases, hundreds of brands from countries around the world.” Lucid was first documented by Swiss cybersecurity company PRODAFT earlier this April, detailing the phishing kit’s ability to send smishing messages via Apple iMessage and Rich Communication Services (RCS) for Android. The service is assessed to be the work of a Chinese-speaking threat actor known as the XinXin group (changqixinyun), which has also leveraged other phishing kits like Lighthouse and Darcula in its operations.

Darcula is developed by an actor named LARVA-246 (aka X667788X0 or xxhcvv), while Lighthouse’s development has been linked to LARVA-241 (aka Lao Wang or Wang Duo Yu). The Lucid PhaaS platform enables customers to mount phishing campaigns at scale, targeting a wide range of industries, including toll companies, governments, postal companies, and financial institutions. These attacks also incorporate various criteria – such as requiring a specific mobile User-Agent, proxy country, or a fraudster-configured path – to ensure that only the intended targets can access the phishing URLs. If a user other than the target ends up visiting the URL, they are served a generic fake storefront instead.

In all, Netcraft said it has detected phishing URLs targeting 164 brands based in 63 different countries hosted through the Lucid platform. Lighthouse phishing URLs have targeted 204 brands based in 50 different countries. Lighthouse, like Lucid, offers template customization and real-time victim monitoring, and boasts the ability to create phishing templates for over 200 platforms across the world, indicating significant overlaps between the two PhaaS toolkits. Prices for Lighthouse range from $88 for a week to $1,588 for a yearly subscription.

“While Lighthouse operates independently of the XinXin group, its alignment with Lucid in terms of infrastructure and targeting patterns highlights the broader trend of collaboration and innovation within the PhaaS ecosystem,” PRODAFT noted back in April. Phishing campaigns using Lighthouse have used URLs impersonating the Albanian postal service Posta Shqiptare, while serving the same fake shopping site to non-targets, suggesting a potential link between Lucid and Lighthouse. “Lucid and Lighthouse are examples of how fast the growth and evolution of these platforms can occur and how difficult they can sometimes be to disrupt,” Netcraft researcher Harry Everett said. The development comes as the London-based company revealed that phishing attacks are moving away from communication channels like Telegram to transit stolen data, painting a picture of a platform that’s no longer likely to be considered a safe haven for cybercriminals.

In its place, threat actors are returning to email as a channel for harvesting stolen credentials, with Netcraft seeing a 25% increase in a span of a month. Cybercriminals have also been found to use services like EmailJS to harvest login details and two-factor authentication (2FA) codes from victims, eliminating the need for hosting their own infrastructure altogether. “This resurgence is partly due to the federated nature of email, which makes takedowns harder,” security researcher Penn Mackintosh said . “Each address or SMTP relay must be reported individually, unlike centralized platforms like Discord or Telegram.

And it’s also about convenience. Creating a throwaway email address remains quick, anonymous, and virtually free.” The findings also follow the emergence of new lookalike domains using the Japanese Hiragana character “ん” to pass off fake website URLs as almost identical to their legitimate ones in what’s called a homoglyph attack. No less than 600 bogus domains employing this technique have been identified in attacks aimed at cryptocurrency users, with the earliest recorded use dating back to November 25, 2024. These pages impersonate legitimate browser extensions on the Chrome Web Store, deceiving unsuspecting users into installing fake wallet apps for Phantom, Rabby, OKX, Coinbase, MetaMask, Exodus, PancakeSwap, Bitget, and Trust that are designed to capture system information or harvest seed phrases, giving the attackers full control over their wallets.

“At a quick glance, it is intended to look like a forward slash ‘/,’” Netcraft said . “And when it’s dropped into a domain name, it’s easy to see how it can be convincing. That tiny swap is enough to make a phishing site domain look real, which is the goal of threat actors trying to steal logins and personal information or distribute malware.” In recent months, scams have also exploited the brand identities of American firms like Delta Airlines, AMC Theatres, Universal Studios, and Epic Records to enroll people in schemes that offer a way to earn money by completing a series of tasks, such as operating as a flight booking agent. The catch here is that in order to do so, would-be victims are asked to deposit at least $100 worth of cryptocurrency to their accounts, allowing the threat actors to make illicit profits.

The task scam “illustrates how opportunistic actors are weaponizing API-driven brand-impersonation templates to scale financially motivated fraud across multiple verticals,” Netcraft researcher Rob Duncan said . Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

How To Automate Alert Triage With AI Agents and Confluence SOPs Using Tines

Run by the team at workflow orchestration and AI platform Tines, the Tines library features over 1,000 pre-built workflows shared by security practitioners from across the community - all free to import and deploy through the platform’s Community Edition. The workflow we are highlighting streamlines security alert handling by automatically identifying and executing the appropriate Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) from Confluence. When an alert triggers, AI agents analyze it, locate relevant SOPs, and perform required remediation steps - all while keeping the on-call team informed via Slack. It was created by Michael Tolan, Security Researcher L2 at Tines, and Peter Wrenn, Senior Solutions Engineer at Tines.

In this guide, we’ll share an overview of the workflow, plus step-by-step instructions for getting it up and running. The problem - manual alert triage and SOP execution For security teams, responding to alerts efficiently requires quickly identifying the threat type, locating the appropriate SOP, and executing the required remediation steps. From a workflow perspective, teams often have to: Manually analyze incoming security alerts Search through Confluence for relevant SOPs Document findings and actions in case management systems Execute multiple remediation steps across different security tools Update the case management system again after the fact Notify stakeholders about incidents and actions taken This manual process is time-consuming, prone to human error, and can lead to inconsistent handling of similar alerts. The solution - AI-powered alert triage with automated SOP execution This prebuilt workflow automates the entire alert triage process by leveraging AI agents and Confluence SOPs.

The workflow helps security teams respond faster and more consistently by: Using AI to analyze and classify incoming alerts Automatically locating relevant SOPs in Confluence Creating structured case records for tracking Deploying a second AI agent (subagent) to execute remediation steps Documenting all actions and notifying the on-call team via Slack The result is a streamlined response to security alerts that ensures consistent handling according to established procedures. Key benefits of this workflow Reduced mean time to remediation (MTTR) Consistent application of security procedures Comprehensive documentation of all actions taken Reduced analyst fatigue from repetitive tasks Improved visibility through automated notifications Workflow overview Tools used: Tines - workflow orchestration and AI platform (free Community Edition available) Confluence - knowledge management platform for SOPs This specific workflow also uses the following pieces of software. However, you can use whatever enrichment/ remediation tools currently existing within your technology stack alongside Tines and Confluence. CrowdStrike - threat intelligence and EDR platform AbuseIPDB - IP reputation database EmailRep - email reputation service Okta - identity and access management Slack - team collaboration platform Tavily - AI research tool URLScan.io - URL analysis service VirusTotal - file and URL scanning service How it works Part 1: Alert Ingestion and Analysis Receive security alert from integrated security tools AI agent analyzes the alert to determine type and severity System searches Confluence for relevant SOPs based on alert classification Create a case record with alert details and identified SOP Part 2: Remediation and Documentation Second AI agent reviews the case and SOP instructions AI agent orchestrates remediation actions across appropriate security tools All actions are documented in the case history Slack notification is sent to the on-call team with alert details and actions taken Configuring the workflow - step-by-step guide 1.

Log into Tines or create a new account. 2. Navigate to the pre-built workflow in the library. Select import.

Set up your credentials You’ll need credentials for all the tools used in this workflow. You can add or remove whatever tools you wish to suit your environment. Confluence CrowdStrike AbuseIPDB EmailRep Okta Slack Tavily URLScan.io VirusTotal From the credentials page, select New credential, scroll down to the relevant credential and complete the required fields.

Follow the credential guides at explained.tines.com if you need help. 4. Configure your actions. Set your environment variables.

In this particular workflow, that specifically requires setting the Slack channel for notifications (hardcoded to #alerts by default, but can be adjusted in the Slack action). 5. Customize the AI prompts The workflow includes two key AI agents: Alert Analysis Agent: Customize the prompt to help identify alert types Remediation Agent: Customize the prompt to guide remediation actions

Test the workflow.

Create a test alert to verify: Alert is properly classified Correct SOP is retrieved from Confluence Case is created with appropriate details Remediation steps are executed Slack notification is sent

Publish and operationalize Once tested, publish the workflow and integrate with your security tools to begin receiving live alerts. If you’d like to test this workflow, you can sign up for a free Tines account. Found this article interesting?

This article is a contributed piece from one of our valued partners. Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Weaponized GenAI + Extortion-First Strategies Fueling a New Age of Ransomware

Russian Hackers Gamaredon and Turla Collaborate to Deploy Kazuar Backdoor in Ukraine

Cybersecurity researchers have discerned evidence of two Russian hacking groups Gamaredon and Turla collaborating together to target and co-comprise Ukrainian entities. Slovak cybersecurity company ESET said it observed the Gamaredon tools PteroGraphin and PteroOdd being used to execute Turla group’s Kazuar backdoor on an endpoint in Ukraine in February 2025, indicating that Turla is very likely actively collaborating with Gamaredon to gain access to specific machines in Ukraine and deliver the Kazuar backdoor. “PteroGraphin was used to restart the Kazuar v3 backdoor, possibly after it crashed or was not launched automatically,” ESET said in a report shared with The Hacker News. “Thus, PteroGraphin was probably used as a recovery method by Turla.” In a separate instance in April and June 2025, ESET said it also detected the deployment of Kazuar v2 through two other Gamaredon malware families tracked as PteroOdd and PteroPaste.

Both Gamaredon (aka Aqua Blizzard and Armageddon) and Turla (aka Secret Blizzard and Venomous Bear) are assessed to be affiliated with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and are known for their attacks targeting Ukraine. “Gamaredon has been active since at least 2013. It is responsible for many attacks, mostly against Ukrainian governmental institutions,” ESET said. “Turla, also known as Snake, is an infamous cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2004, possibly extending back into the late 1990s.

It mainly focuses on high-profile targets, such as governments and diplomatic entities, in Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. It is known for having breached major organizations such as the US Department of Defense in 2008 and the Swiss defense company RUAG in 2014.” The cybersecurity company said Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 likely fueled this convergence, with the attacks primarily focusing on the Ukrainian defense sector in recent months. One of Turla’s staple implants is Kazuar , a frequently updated malware that has previously leveraged Amadey bots to deploy a backdoor called Tavdig, which then drops the .NET-based tool. Early artifacts associated with the malware have been spotted in the wild as far back as 2016, per Kaspersky .

PteroGraphin, PteroOdd, and PteroPaste, on the other hand, are part of a growing arsenal of tools developed by Gamaredeon to deliver additional payloads. PteroGraphin is a PowerShell tool that uses Microsoft Excel add-ins and scheduled tasks as a persistence mechanism and uses the Telegraph API for command-and-control (C2). It was first discovered in August 2024. The exact initial access vector used by Gamaredon is not clear, but the group has a history of using spear-phishing and malicious LNK files on removable drives using tools like PteroLNK for propagation.

In all, Turla-related indicators have been detected on seven machines in Ukraine over the past 18 months, out of which four were breached by Gamaredon in January 2025. The deployment of the latest version of Kazuar (Kazuar v3) is said to have taken place towards the end of February. “Kazuar v2 and v3 are fundamentally the same malware family and share the same codebase,” ESET said. “Kazuar v3 comprises around 35% more C# lines than Kazuar v2 and introduces additional network transport methods: over web sockets and Exchange Web Services.” The attack chain involved Gamaredon deploying PteroGraphin, which was used to download a PowerShell downloader dubbed PteroOdd that, in turn, retrieved a payload from Telegraph to execute Kazuar.

The payload is also designed to gather and exfiltrate the victim’s computer name and system drive’s volume serial number to a Cloudflare Workers sub-domain, before launching Kazuar. That said, it’s important to note here that there are signs suggesting Gamaredon downloaded Kazuar, as the backdoor is said to have been present on the system since February 11, 2025. In a sign that this was not an isolated phenomenon, ESET revealed that it identified another PteroOdd sample on a different machine in Ukraine in March 2025, on which Kazuar was also present. The malware is capable of harvesting a wide range of system information, along with a list of installed .NET versions, and transmitting them to an external domain (“eset.ydns[.]eu”).

The fact that Gamaredon’s toolset lacks any .NET malware and Turla’s Kazuar is based in .NET suggests this data gathering step is likely meant for Turla, the company assessed with medium confidence. The second set of attacks was detected in mid-April 2025, when PteroOdd was used to drop another PowerShell downloader codenamed PteroEﬃgy, which ultimately contacted the “eset.ydns[.]eu” domain to deliver Kazuar v2 (“scrss.ps1”), which was documented by Palo Alto Networks in late 2023. ESET said it also detected a third attack chain on June 5 and 6, 2025, it observed a PowerShell downloader referred to as PteroPaste being employed to drop and install Kazuar v2 (“ekrn.ps1”) from the domain “91.231.182[.]187” on two machines located in Ukraine. The use of the name “ekrn” is possibly an attempt by threat actors to masquerade as “ekrn.exe,” a legitimate binary associated with ESET endpoint security products.

“We now believe with high confidence that both groups – separately associated with the FSB – are cooperating and that Gamaredon is providing initial access to Turla,” ESET researchers Matthieu Faou and Zoltán Rusnák said. Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

U.K. Arrests Two Teen Scattered Spider Hackers Linked to August 2024 TfL Cyber Attack

Law enforcement authorities in the U.K. have arrested two teen members of the Scattered Spider hacking group in connection with their alleged participation in an August 2024 cyber attack targeting Transport for London (TfL), the city’s public transportation agency. Thalha Jubair (aka EarthtoStar, Brad, Austin, and @autistic), 19, from East London and Owen Flowers, 18, from Walsall, West Midlands were arrested at their home addresses on Tuesday, the National Crime Agency (NCA) said. They are 19 and 18, respectively.

It’s worth noting that Flowers was initially arrested for his alleged involvement in the TfL attack in September 2024, but was subsequently released on bail. The agency said it found evidence of Flowers targeting U.S. healthcare companies, and that he has also been charged with conspiring with others to infiltrate and damage the networks of SSM Health Care Corporation and Sutter Health. Jubair has also been charged under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 for failing to surrender PINs and passwords for devices seized by law enforcement from him on March 19, 2025.

“This attack caused significant disruption and millions in losses to TfL, part of the UK’s critical national infrastructure,” Deputy Director Paul Foster, head of the NCA’s National Cyber Crime Unit, said . “Earlier this year, the NCA warned of an increase in the threat from cyber criminals based in the U.K. and other English-speaking countries, of which Scattered Spider is a clear example.” In tandem, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) unsealed a complaint charging Jubair with conspiracies to commit computer fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering in relation to at least 120 computer network intrusions and extorting 47 U.S.

entities from May 2022 to September 2025. These attacks involved the use of social engineering techniques to gain unauthorized access to the target networks, and then leveraging that access to steal and encrypt information, and demand ransom from victims in return for regaining control and preventing the leak of the exfiltrated data. According to the complaint, victims paid at least $115,000,000 in ransom payments. The incidents, the DoJ added, caused widespread disruption to U.S.

businesses and organizations, including critical infrastructure and the federal court system, in October 2024 and January 2025. In July 2024, the DoJ said law enforcement seized cryptocurrency wallets on a server allegedly controlled by Jubair and confiscated digital assets worth about $36 million at the time. Jubair is also said to have transferred a portion of the proceeds that originated from one of the victims, worth about $8.4 million at the time, to another wallet. Jubair has been charged with computer fraud conspiracy, two counts of computer fraud, wire fraud conspiracy, two counts of wire fraud, and money laundering conspiracy.

If convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of 95 years in prison. “Jubair went to great and sophisticated lengths to keep himself anonymous while he and his criminal associates continued to attack these victims and extort tens of millions of dollars in ransom payments,” said Alina Habba, Acting U.S. Attorney and Special Attorney for the District of New Jersey. Found this article interesting?

CISA Warns of Two Malware Strains Exploiting Ivanti EPMM CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Thursday released details of two sets of malware that were discovered in an unnamed organization’s network following the exploitation of security flaws in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM). “Each set contains loaders for malicious listeners that enable cyber threat actors to run arbitrary code on the compromised server,” CISA said in an alert. The vulnerabilities that were exploited in the attack include CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428 , both of which have been abused as zero-days prior to them being addressed by Ivanti in May 2025.

While CVE-2025-4427 concerns an authentication bypass that allows attackers to access protected resources, CVE-2025-4428 enables remote code execution. As a result, the two flaws could be chained to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable device without authentication. According to CISA, the threat actors gained access to server running EPMM by combing the two vulnerabilities around May 15, 2025, following the publication of a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit. This permitted the attackers to run commands that made it possible to collect system information, download malicious files, list the root directory, map the network, execute scripts to create a heapdump, and dump Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) credentials, the agency added.

Further analysis determined that the cyber threat actors dropped two sets of malicious files to the “/tmp” directory, each of which enabled persistence by injecting and running arbitrary code on the compromised server: Set 1

web-install.jar (aka Loader 1), ReflectUtil.class, and SecurityHandlerWanListener.class Set 2
web-install.jar (aka Loader 2) and WebAndroidAppInstaller.class Specifically, both sets contain a loader which launches a malicious compiled Java class listener that intercepts specific HTTP requests and processes them to decode and decrypt payloads for subsequent execution. “ReflectUtil.class manipulates Java objects to inject and manage the malicious listener SecurityHandlerWanListener in Apache Tomcat,” CISA said. “[SecurityHandlerWanListener.class] is a malicious listener that intercepts specific HTTP requests and processes them to decode and decrypt payloads, which dynamically create and execute a new class.” WebAndroidAppInstaller.class, on the other hand, works differently by retrieving and decrypting a password parameter from the request using a hard-coded key, the contents of which are used to define and implement a new class. The result of the execution of the new class is then encrypted using the same hard-coded key and generates a response with the encrypted output.

The end result is that it allows the attackers to inject and execute arbitrary code on the server, enabling follow-on activity and persistence, as well as exfiltrate data by intercepting and processing HTTP requests. To stay protected against these attacks, organizations are advised to update their instances to the latest version, monitor for signs of suspicious activity, and implement necessary restrictions to prevent unauthorized access to mobile device management (MDM) systems. Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

SonicWall Urges Password Resets After Cloud Backup Breach Affecting Under 5% of Customers

SonicWall is urging customers to reset credentials after their firewall configuration backup files were exposed in a security breach impacting MySonicWall accounts. The company said it recently detected suspicious activity targeting the cloud backup service for firewalls, and that unknown threat actors accessed backup firewall preference files stored in the cloud for less than 5% of its customers. “While credentials within the files were encrypted, the files also included information that could make it easier for attackers to potentially exploit the related firewall,” the company said . The network security company said it’s not aware of any of these files being leaked online by the threat actors, adding it was not a ransomware event targeting its network.

“Rather this was a series of brute-force attacks aimed at gaining access to the preference files stored in backup for potential further use by threat actors,” it noted. It’s currently not known who is responsible for the attack. As a result of the incident, the company is urging customers to follow the steps below - Login to MySonicWall.com and verify if cloud backups are enabled Verify if affected serial numbers have been flagged in the accounts Initiate containment and remediation procedures by limiting access to services from WAN, turning off access to HTTP/HTTPS/SSH Management, disabling access to SSL VPN and IPSec VPN, reset passwords and TOTPs saved on the firewall, and review logs and recent configuration changes for unusual activity In addition, affected customers have also been recommended to import fresh preferences files provided by SonicWall into the firewalls. The new preferences file includes the following changes - Randomized password for all local users Reset TOTP binding, if enabled Randomized IPSec VPN keys “The modified preferences file provided by SonicWall was created from the latest preferences file found in cloud storage,” it said.

“If the latest preferences file does not represent your desired settings, please do not use the file.” The disclosure comes as threat actors affiliated with the Akira ransomware group have continued to target unpatched SonicWall devices for obtaining initial access to target networks by exploiting a year-old security flaw (CVE-2024-40766, CVSS score: 9.3). Earlier this week, cybersecurity company Huntress detailed an Akira ransomware incident involving the exploitation of SonicWall VPNs in which the threat actors leveraged a plaintext file containing recovery codes of its security software to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), suppress incident visibility, and attempt to remove endpoint protections. “In this incident, the attacker used exposed Huntress recovery codes to log into the Huntress portal, close active alerts, and initiate the uninstallation of Huntress EDR agents, effectively attempting to blind the organization’s defenses and leave it vulnerable to follow-on attacks,” researchers Michael Elford and Chad Hudson said . “This level of access can be weaponized to disable defenses, manipulate detection tools, and execute further malicious actions.

Organizations should treat recovery codes with the same sensitivity as privileged account passwords.” Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

CountLoader Broadens Russian Ransomware Operations With Multi-Version Malware Loader

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new malware loader codenamed CountLoader that has been put to use by Russian ransomware gangs to deliver post-exploitation tools like Cobalt Strike and AdaptixC2 , and a remote access trojan known as PureHVNC RAT. “CountLoader is being used either as part of an Initial Access Broker’s (IAB) toolset or by a ransomware affiliate with ties to the LockBit, Black Basta, and Qilin ransomware groups,” Silent Push said in an analysis. Appearing in three different versions – .NET, PowerShell, and JavaScript – the emerging threat has been observed in a campaign targeting individuals in Ukraine using PDF-based phishing lures and impersonating the National Police of Ukraine. Silent Push told The Hacker News that it does not have any insight into the nature of malware that was dropped using CountLoader.

It’s worth noting that the PowerShell version of the malware was previously flagged by Kaspersky as being distributed using DeepSeek-related decoys to trick users into installing it. The attacks, per the Russian cybersecurity vendor, led to the deployment of an implant named BrowserVenom that can reconfigure all browsing instances to force traffic through a proxy controlled by the threat actors, enabling the attackers to manipulate network traffic and collect data. Silent Push’s investigation has found the JavaScript version is the most fleshed out implementation of the loader, offering six different methods for file downloading, three different methods for executing various malware binaries, and a predefined function to identify a victim’s device based on Windows domain information. The malware is also capable of gathering system information, setting up persistence on the host by creating a scheduled task that impersonates a Google update task for the Chrome web browser, and connecting to a remote server to await further instructions.

This includes the ability to download and run DLL and MSI installer payloads using rundll32.exe and msiexec.exe, transmit system metadata, and delete the created scheduled task. The six methods used to download files involve the use of curl, PowerShell, MSXML2.XMLHTTP, WinHTTP.WinHttpRequest.5.1, bitsadmin, and certutil.exe. “By using LOLBins like ‘certutil’ and ‘bitsadmin,’ and by implementing an ‘on the fly’ command encryption PowerShell generator, CountLoader’s developers demonstrate here an advanced understanding of the Windows operating system and malware development,” Silent Push said. A notable aspect of CountLoader is its use of the victim’s Music folder as a staging ground for malware.

The .NET flavor shares some degree of functional crossover with its JavaScript counterpart, but supports only two different types of commands (UpdateType.Zip or UpdateType.Exe), indicating a reduced, stripped-down version. CountLoader is supported by an infrastructure comprising over 20 unique domains, with the malware serving as a conduit for Cobalt Strike, AdaptixC2, and PureHVNC RAT, the last of which is a commercial offering from a threat actor known as PureCoder . It’s worth pointing out that PureHVNC RAT is a predecessor to PureRAT , which is also referred to as ResolverRAT . Recent campaigns distributing PureHVNC RAT have leveraged the tried-and-tested ClickFix social engineering tactic as a delivery vector, with victims lured to the ClickFix phishing page through fake job offers, per Check Point.

The trojan is deployed by means of a Rust-based loader. “The attacker lured the victim through fake job advertisements, allowing the attacker to execute malicious PowerShell code through the ClickFix phishing technique,” the cybersecurity company said , describing PureCoder as using a revolving set of GitHub accounts to host files that support the functionality of PureRAT. Analysis of the GitHub commits has revealed that activity was carried out from the timezone UTC+03:00, which corresponds to many countries, including Russia, among others. The development comes as the DomainTools Investigations team has uncovered the interconnected nature of the Russian ransomware landscape, identifying threat actor movements across groups and the use of tools like AnyDesk and Quick Assist, suggesting operational overlaps.

“Brand allegiance among these operators is weak, and human capital appears to be the primary asset, rather than specific malware strains,” DomainTools said . “Operators adapt to market conditions, reorganize in response to takedowns, and trust relationships are critical. These individuals will choose to work with people they know, regardless of the name of the organization.” Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

SilentSync RAT Delivered via Two Malicious PyPI Packages Targeting Python Developers

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered two new malicious packages in the Python Package Index (PyPI) repository that are designed to deliver a remote access trojan called SilentSync on Windows systems. “SilentSync is capable of remote command execution, file exfiltration, and screen capturing,” Zscaler ThreatLabz’s Manisha Ramcharan Prajapati and Satyam Singh said . “SilentSync also extracts web browser data, including credentials, history, autofill data, and cookies from web browsers like Chrome, Brave, Edge, and Firefox.” The packages, now no longer available for download from PyPI, are listed below. They were both uploaded by a user named “CondeTGAPIS.” sisaws (201 Downloads) secmeasure (627 Downloads) Zscaler said the package sisaws mimics the behavior of the legitimate Python package sisa, which is associated with Argentina’s national health information system, Sistema Integrado de Información Sanitaria Argentino (SISA).

However, present in the library is a function called “gen_token()” in the initialization script (init.py) that acts as a downloader for a next-stage malware. To achieve this, it sends a hard-coded token as input, and receives as response a secondary static token in a manner that’s similar to the legitimate SISA API. “If a developer imports the sisaws package and invokes the gen_token function, the code will decode a hexadecimal string that reveals a curl command, which is then used to fetch an additional Python script,” Zscaler said. “The Python script retrieved from PasteBin is written to the filename helper.py in a temporary directory and executed.” Secmeasure, in a similar fashion, masquerades as a “library for cleaning strings and applying security measures,” but harbors embedded functionality to drop SilentSync RAT.

SilentSync is mainly geared towards infecting Windows systems at this stage, but the malware is also equipped with built-in features for Linux and macOS as well, making Registry modifications on Windows, altering the crontab file on Linux to execute the payload on system startup, and registering a LaunchAgent on macOS. The package relies on the secondary token’s presence to send an HTTP GET request to a hard-coded endpoint (“200.58.107[.]25”) in order to receive Python code that’s directly executed in memory. The server supports four different endpoints - /checkin, to verify connectivity /comando, to request commands to execute /respuesta, to send a status message /archivo, to send command output or stolen data The malware is capable of harvesting browser data, executing shell commands, capturing screenshots, and stealing files. It can also exfiltrate files and entire directories in the form of ZIP archives.

Once the data is transmitted, all the artifacts are deleted from the host to sidestep detection efforts. “The discovery of the malicious PyPI packages sisaws and secmeasure highlight the growing risk of supply chain attacks within public software repositories,” Zscaler said. “By leveraging typosquatting and impersonating legitimate packages, threat actors can gain access to personally identifiable information (PII).” Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News , Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

How CISOs Can Drive Effective AI Governance

AI’s growing role in enterprise environments has heightened the urgency for Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) to drive effective AI governance. When it comes to any emerging technology, governance is hard – but effective governance is even harder. The first instinct for most organizations is to respond with rigid policies. Write a policy document, circulate a set of restrictions, and hope the risk is contained.

However, effective governance doesn’t work that way. It must be a living system that shapes how AI is used every day, guiding organizations through safe transformative change without slowing down the pace of innovation. For CISOs, finding that balance between security and speed is critical in the age of AI. This technology simultaneously represents the greatest opportunity and greatest risk enterprises have faced since the dawn of the internet.

Move too fast without guardrails, and sensitive data leaks into prompts, shadow AI proliferates, or regulatory gaps become liabilities. Move too slow, and competitors pull ahead with transformative efficiencies that are too powerful to compete with. Either path comes with ramifications that can cost CISOs their job. In turn, they cannot lead a “department of no” where AI adoption initiatives are stymied by the organization’s security function.

It is crucial to instead find a path to yes, mapping governance to organizational risk tolerance and business priorities so that the security function serves as a true revenue enabler. Over the course of this article, I’ll share three components that can help CISOs make that shift and drive AI governance programs that enable safe adoption at scale. 1. Understand What’s Happening on the Ground When ChatGPT first arrived in November 2022, most CISOs I know scrambled to publish strict policies that told employees what not to do.

It came from a place of positive intent considering sensitive data leakage was a legitimate concern. However, while policies written from that “document backward” approach are great in theory, they rarely work in practice. Due to how fast AI is evolving, AI governance must be designed through a “real-world forward” mindset that accounts for what’s really happening on the ground inside an organization. This requires CISOs to have a foundational understanding of AI: the technology itself, where it is embedded, which SaaS platforms are enabling it, and how employees are using it to get their jobs done.

AI inventories, model registries, and cross-functional committees may sound like buzzwords, but they are practical mechanisms that can help security leaders develop this AI fluency. For example, an AI Bill of Materials (AIBOM) offers visibility into the components, datasets, and external services that will feed an AI model. Just as a software bill of materials (SBOM) clarifies third-party dependencies, an AIBOM ensures leaders know what data is being used, where it came from, and what risks it introduces. Model registries serve a similar role for AI systems already in use.

They track which models are deployed, when they were last updated, and how they’re performing to prevent “black box sprawl” and inform decisions about patching, decommissioning, or scaling usage. AI committees ensure that oversight doesn’t fall on security or IT alone. Often chaired by a designated AI lead or risk officer, these groups include representatives from legal, compliance, HR, and business units – turning governance from a siloed directive into a shared responsibility that bridges security concerns with business outcomes. 2.

Align Policies to the Speed of the Organization Without real-world forward policies, security leaders often fall into the trap of codifying controls they cannot realistically deliver. I’ve seen this firsthand through a CISO colleague of mine. Knowing employees were already experimenting with AI, he worked to enable the responsible adoption of several GenAI applications across his workforce. However, when a new CIO joined the organization and felt there were too many GenAI applications in use, the CISO was directed to ban all GenAI until one enterprise-wide platform was selected.

Fast forward one year later, that single platform still hadn’t been implemented, and employees were using unapproved GenAI tools that exposed the organization to shadow AI vulnerabilities. The CISO was stuck trying to enforce a blanket ban he couldn’t execute, fielding criticism without the authority to implement a workable solution. This kind of scenario plays out when policies are written faster than they can be executed, or when they fail to anticipate the pace of organizational adoption. Policies that look decisive on paper can quickly become obsolete if they don’t evolve with leadership changes, embedded AI functionality, and the organic ways employees integrate new tools into their work.

Governance must be flexible enough to adapt, or else it risks leaving security teams enforcing the impossible. The way forward is to design policies as living documents. They should evolve as the business does, informed by actual use cases and aligned to measurable outcomes. Governance also can’t stop at policy; it needs to cascade into standards, procedures, and baselines that guide daily work.

Only then do employees know what secure AI adoption really looks like in practice. 3. Make AI Governance Sustainable Even with strong policies and roadmaps in place, employees will continue to use AI in ways that aren’t formally approved. The goal for security leaders shouldn’t be to ban AI, but to make responsible use the easiest and most attractive option.

That means equipping employees with enterprise-grade AI tools, whether purchased or homegrown, so they do not need to reach for insecure alternatives. In addition, it means highlighting and reinforcing positive behaviors so that employees see value in following the guardrails rather than bypassing them. Sustainable governance also stems from Utilizing AI and Protecting AI , two pillars of the SANS Institute’s recently published Secure AI Blueprint . To govern AI effectively, CISOs should empower their SOC teams to effectively utilize AI for cyber defense – automating noise reduction and enrichment, validating detections against threat intelligence, and ensuring analysts remain in the loop for escalation and incident response.

They should also ensure the right controls are in place to protect AI systems from adversarial threats, as outlined in the SANS Critical AI Security Guidelines . Learn More at SANS Cyber Defense Initiative 2025 This December, SANS will be offering LDR514: Security Strategic Planning, Policy, and Leadership at SANS Cyber Defense Initiative 2025 in Washington, D.C. This course is designed for leaders who want to move beyond generic governance advice and learn how to build business-driven security programs that steer organizations to safe AI adoption. It will cover how to create actionable policies, align governance with business strategy, and embed security into culture so you can lead your enterprise through the AI era securely.

If you’re ready to turn AI governance into a business enabler, register for SANS CDI 2025 here . Note: This article was contributed by Frank Kim, SANS Institute Fellow. Found this article interesting? This article is a contributed piece from one of our valued partners.